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Japan’s development assistance to conflict-affected areas in Mindanao, southern 
Philippines, opened new pathways for the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) to support multilateral peacebuilding efforts. JICA, in collaboration with 
Universiti Sains Malaysia, organized a series of Consolidation for Peace Seminars as 
Track One-and-a-Half mediations. Two aspects of Japan’s assistance to Mindanao 
enabled JICA to engage in peacemaking. First, Japan’s assistance to Mindanao 
formed a unique tripartite cooperation mechanism consisting of the International 
Monitoring Team, Mindanao Task Force, and Japan-Bangsamoro Initiative for 
Reconstruction and Development. JICA took part in all three modes of assistance. 
Second, providing assistance under a volatile cease-fire agreement in Mindanao 
motivated JICA to become involved in peacemaking outside the traditional function 
of development assistance.
Keywords peacebuilding, peacemaking, human security, ODA, JICA, Track One- 
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Introduction
Japan’s search for a role in international peacebuilding as its contribution to 
international security began after a 13 billion yen financial contribution to 
the Gulf War (1990-1991) was regarded as mere “checkbook diplomacy” by 
the international community (Funabashi 1990). Japan turned to its Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) to promote itself as a peace-loving nation 
that was willing to share its expertise in supporting development and peaceful 
resolution of conflicts where needed (Lincoln 1993). The Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA)—the main implementing body of ODA—actually 
began taking part in peacebuilding in 1993 during the process of post-conflict 
rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia, although the term itself was not 
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widely used at the time.
In fact, it was only in 2003 that the term peacebuilding was officially used 
in Japan’s ODA Charter, where it was defined as activities throughout the whole 
process of a conflict, including conflict prevention, emergency humanitarian 
assistance in conflict situations, assistance in expediting the ending of conflicts, 
the consolidation of peace, and nation-building in post-conflict situations 
(MOFA 2003). In the same charter the concept of human security was promoted 
as a basic policy of Japan’s ODA. Japan had been promoting the idea of human 
security since the late 1990s alongside Canada and other countries, but while 
Canada interpreted human security in the context of Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P), Japan emphasized its development facet (Edstrom 2011, 21). As the 
concept connects peace with development, peacebuilding could be viewed as part 
of Japan’s mode of development assistance (Inada 2004; Shinoda 2003; Conteh-
Morgan 2005).
Yet JICA’s role in peacebuilding truly began to evolve in 2006 when efforts 
were initiated to provide assistance to conflict-affected areas in Mindanao in the 
southern Philippines. There were three major departures from JICA’s practice as 
a development agency. First, JICA decided to commence assistance under the 
cease-fire agreement, before a final peace agreement was signed between the 
Philippine Government (GRP/GPH)1 and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF). It was difficult for a development agency to decide under such volatile 
circumstances the types of assistance needed in the conflict-affected areas 
without jeopardizing the status quo between the conflicting parties. Second, JICA 
was working under tremendous pressure because of the uncertainty of the peace 
process. However, JICA was aware of key local needs and the security situation in 
Mindanao, and collaborated extremely well with all parties and agencies involved. 
This resulted in strong support for the peacebuilding process on the ground. 
Third, JICA also supported peacemaking efforts by an innovative Track One-and-
a-Half mediation initiative after the peace process reached a stalemate in October 
2008. 
This article attempts to answer three major questions about JICA’s 
development assistance in Mindanao: Why did JICA decide to enter Mindanao 
prior to the conclusion of a proper peace agreement? How did JICA manage its 
development assistance to maintain a fine balance with the peace process? And, 
what are the implications of JICA’s Track One-and-a-Half mediation attempt 
in the larger context of Japan’s peacebuilding assistance? The article argues 
that the notion of human security influenced JICA’s decision to commence its 
assistance under the cease-fire agreement. Japan’s unique cooperation mechanism 
in Mindanao also enabled JICA to carry out its assistance in the conflict-
affected areas in support of the peace process between MILF and the Philippine 
government. Moreover, Track One-and-a-Half mediation shows the potential for 
development agencies to support peacemaking.
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The Mindanao Conflict and the GRP/GPH-MILF Peace Process
We will touch briefly here on the Mindanao conflict to understand the 
background of JICA’s peacebuilding assistance in that area. The conflict in 
Mindanao is a typical protracted social conflict (Azar 1990), wherein hostile 
interactions between identity groups continue over a long period of time with 
sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity (Azar 
et al. 1978, 50; Fisher 1997, 79). External (colonial legacy) and domestic (historical 
and social formation) factors can be identified as primary causes of this kind 
of conflict. In the case of Mindanao, the legacy of Spanish and American 
colonization of the Philippines is hard to ignore, as the marginalized and usurped 
population in Mindanao was left in need of proper recognition of its identity, 
cultural values, physical security, sufficient livelihood, and equal participation in 
politics in the modern Philippines (Lingga 2005; Ferrera 2005). Poverty has also 
been recognized as a cause of conflict. A number of scholars pointed out that 
the 1968 Jabidah Massacre in Corregidor triggered the armed Moro resistance 
(Ferrera 2005, 10; Lam 2009, 76) and over the next thirty years the struggle has 
continued with fluctuations in intensity and frequency of violence as well as with 
spillovers in issues and actors. 
The MILF was born as a factional group within the Moro National Liberation 
Front (MNLF) just before the first Tripoli Agreement of 19762 was signed. 
MILF’s vision for the Bangsamoro armed struggle was (1) the establishment of 
a true Muslim community, (2) the establishment of a genuine Islamic system of 
government, and (3) the application of a genuine Islamic way of life in all aspects 
of society (Mastura 2012). With the conclusion of the GRP-MNLF peace pact 
in 1996, President Fidel Ramos (1992-1998) started a round of peace talks with 
the MILF in 1997, but that was just the beginning of a long journey for the peace 
process. 
President Joseph Estrada (1998-2001), the successor of President Ramos, 
imposed all-out war by the government against the MILF in 2000 and destroyed 
the previous progress. When President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001-2010) 
took over from President Estrada in January 2001, she immediately invited the 
Malaysian government to take up the role of facilitator, and encouraged the MILF 
to accept the resumption of the peace process. The two parties signed the Tripoli 
Agreement of Peace on June 22, 2001, which became the formal agreement on 
pursuing the current peace process. The main agenda for the peace talks included 
issues related to security, relief and rehabilitation, and ancestral domain (Jubair 
2007, 36). The peace negotiations reached a number of agreements, including 
the agreement on the ceasefire and on the setting up of the Bangsamoro 
Development Authority (BDA). There was, however, a long impasse in peace 
talks from September 2006 to early 2008 caused by different views on the issue of 
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the territory to comprise the proposed autonomous region (Jubair 2007, 144-147). 
Perhaps the most discouraging event was the suspension of signing an 
agreement on the ancestral domain and the subsequent decision by the Supreme 
Court of the Philippines in 2008 labeling the agreement unconstitutional. Due 
to the resulting impasse in the peace process, a number of skirmishes broke 
out during this period. On June 3, 2010, just before the end of the term of 
President Arroyo, the peace panels signed a “Declaration of Continuity for Peace 
Negotiation,” which basically re-affirmed consensus points that had already been 
agreed upon throughout the nine years of negotiations between the two parties 
during President Arroyo’s time. 
With the landslide presidential victory of Benigno Aquino, Jr. in June 2010, 
hopes and expectations were raised among people in Mindanao. However, 
resumption of peace talks was marked by disagreement over procedural issues of 
the talks themselves, resulting in a difficult two-year period. Finally a “Framework 
Agreement on the Bangsamoro” was concluded on October 15, 2012. Both 
parties agreed to establish an autonomous territory called the Bangsamoro. By 
late January 2014 substantial issues such as power sharing, wealth sharing, and 
other remaining matters had been agreed to by both parties prior to finalizing the 
final peace agreement. On March 27, 2014, the Comprehensive Agreement on 
the Bangsamoro was finally signed by both the Philippine Government and the 
MILF.
Japan’s Commitment to Mindanao
Japan’s ODA to Mindanao began in 1989. It was then limited only to non-
conflict areas, such as Davao and Cagayan de Oro cities. Changes began after 
December 2002, when the Japanese government launched a new initiative for 
the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). A total of US$40 
million was committed for the implementation of the Support Package for the 
ARMM (MOFA 2002). In 2006, when Japan was invited to join the Malaysia-led 
International Monitoring Team (IMT) based in Cotabato, then-Japanese Foreign 
Minister Taro Aso informed President Arroyo of the Japanese government’s 
decision to send a development expert to the IMT, and also conveyed Japan’s 
desire to contribute more actively to the peace process by assisting those living in 
conflict-affected areas (MOFA 2006). The seriousness of Japan’s intent was made 
clear when Aso also announced that Japan would set up a Mindanao Task Force 
(hereafter referred to as Task Force) as a mechanism for policy discussion on 
Japan’s assistance to Mindanao (MOFA 2006).
A significant Japanese tool for contributing to the peace process was the 
Grant Assistance for Grass-roots Human Security Programs (hereafter referred 
to as Grass-roots Programs) in the conflict-affected areas. This was aimed at 
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ensuring that the projects would directly benefit the people at the grassroots 
level and enable them to experience the dividends of peace, such as through the 
construction of classrooms, vocational training centers, water supply systems, 
and health care centers in the conflict-affected MILF areas. The Grass-roots 
Programs occupied an important position in the Japan-Bangsamoro Initiative for 
Reconstruction and Development (J-BIRD), the overall framework for Japan’s 
ODA to Mindanao. 
JICA’s Role and the Concept of Human Security
After Dr. Sadako Ogata became the president of JICA, in October 2003, JICA 
mainstreamed human security in all areas of its assistance to address freedom 
from fear and freedom from want in the forms of bottom-up and top-down 
approaches. Mindanao became a test case for implementing this concept of 
human security, and Ogata made concrete commitments when she visited the 
Philippines in September 2006. Ogata first announced that JICA hoped to make 
a contribution to the peace process through development assistance under the 
concept of human security (Manila Shinbun 2006). Then she demonstrated her 
belief in human security by paying visits not only to President Arroyo and high-
ranking government officials in Manila, but also to the top echelons on the other 
side of the peace process in Mindanao. She met with Murad Ebrahim, chairman 
of the MILF, in Sultan Kudarat. The fact that Ogata gave equal importance to 
both the Philippine Government and the MILF gave all the concerned parties a 
clear sign of JICA’s serious commitment to Mindanao through both top-down 
and bottom-up approaches. At the end of Ogata’s visit it was also announced 
that Japan would work not only with the Philippine government but also with 
local communities for the promotion of equitable economic growth and the 
enhancement of human security (Ogata 2006).
JICA and Japan’s Tripartite Cooperation Mechanism
JICA has been actively involved in all three modes of Japan’s assistance to 
Mindanao, namely the International Monitoring Team, the Task Force, and 
J-BIRD. This has enabled it to manage its development assistance in a fine balance 
with the peace process.  
Mindanao Task Force
The first mode of Japan’s assistance to Mindanao was the Task Force. The Task 
Force consisted of the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines, JICA, and (until 2006) 
the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). (JBIC’s yen loan operation 
was integrated into JICA in October 2008, and since then the Task Force has been 
convened only with the Embassy of Japan and JICA.) The Task Force’s mandate 
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included the roles of both policy coordinator and also general manager of Japan’s 
assistance to the conflict-affected areas in Mindanao. Chaired by a minister in the 
Japanese embassy, it met once a month to discuss any matters concerning Japan’s 
assistance in the conflict-affected areas in Mindanao, including the progress of 
the peace process and Japan’s efforts in back-channel diplomacy to accelerate the 
peace process. 
The political role of the Task Force was further strengthened when Japan 
was nominated to be a member of the International Contact Group (ICG) in 
July 2009. The ICG monitors the progress of the peace process and advises the 
Peace Panels.3 Japan’s membership in the ICG had at least two advantages: First, 
it became easier for Japan to access first-hand information on the progress of the 
peace talks, which enabled the Japanese government to take appropriate actions 
as a peace-builder, if necessary. Second, most of the information obtained by the 
Japanese delegation, unless absolutely confidential, was shared with JICA by the 
embassy. JICA’s development assistance in the conflict-affected areas has, through 
this mechanism, been linked to the peace process.
International Monitoring Team
The IMT was headed by Malaysia and initially was composed of 60 members, 
including members of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation, Libya, and 
Brunei Darussalam. Its primary role and responsibilities were (1) to observe 
and monitor the implementation of cessation of hostilities, as well as the socio-
economic development aspects of the agreements signed between the Philippine 
government and the MILF, (2) to conduct field verification of any reported 
violations of the cessation of hostilities agreements, and (3) to report to the 
Philippine government and MILF Peace Panels its findings and assessment 
of any violations. Why was Japan asked to join the IMT? First, there was an 
increasing demand for an expanded peace dividend and not simply for a cease-
fire, and thus the IMT’s role gradually expanded to include social-economic 
development issues.4 Furthermore, following the establishment of the IMT in 
2004, the number of skirmishes had decreased in the conflict-affected area by 
90%. Second, there was a demand for Japanese expertise as well as funds in the 
field of development assistance. Third, ready acceptance of Japan’s role by both 
the Philippine government and the MILF was an important factor (Lam 2009, 
82). The development experts dispatched to the IMT were all JICA staff members, 
and they were seconded to the Japanese foreign ministry and to the Japanese 
embassy in Manila before being dispatched to the IMT. Masafumi Nagaishi, the 
first Japanese member of the IMT, conducted the needs assessment which was 
utilized for the establishment of J-BIRD. 
Japan-Bangsamoro Initiative for Reconstruction and Development (J-BIRD) 
J-BIRD was the third mode of Japan’s assistance to Mindanao. J-BIRD started 
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in December 2006 with 12 grass-roots programs in Mindanao. Eventually 
it expanded to include technical cooperation, loan aid, and other relevant 
modalities of assistance aside from these programs. As of March 22, 2012, 
the total amount of the assistance was approximately 12 billion yen (Japanese 
Embassy in the Philippines 2012). The characteristics of J-BIRD can be 
summarized as follows: First, all assistance projects implemented by the Japanese 
government and agencies were presented under the all-inclusive J-BIRD scheme. 
This strengthened the sense of unity and solidarity among the concerned 
parties. Second, J-BIRD soon became visible and popular in conflict-affected 
areas in Mindanao. Every infrastructure project assisted by J-BIRD carried its 
logo on the wall or near the construction site, which became a symbol of good 
quality and also a dividend of peace.5 Third, most of the J-BIRD projects were 
implemented using a bottom-up approach, including deployment of quick 
impact projects and on-the-spot assistance. This indicated the general attitude of 
the Japanese government and JICA towards the conflict-affected areas under a 
cease-fire agreement, that is to place priority on the empowerment of people and 
communities, even while the peace negotiation was on-going. Fourth, J-BIRD 
was well-connected with the socio-economic development needs assessment of 
the IMT, which was carried out by Japanese members.  
On the implementation front, JICA needed to adjust its operational style to 
the special circumstances under the cease-fire agreement. First, the Bangsamoro 
Development Authority was designated as a de facto local partner of JICA 
under the ODA scheme. Since ODA is a governmental development assistance 
scheme, the counterpart of the Japanese government should, in principle, be 
the Philippine government. For the Mindanao case, however, the Philippines 
government approved the involvement of the BDA as a counterpart of donor 
agencies, including JICA, under authority granted by the government. Second, 
the fast-track system was introduced to efficiently implement JICA’s assistance by 
early deployment of appropriate aid personnel to field operations and by skipping 
certain procedures to accelerate decision-making in order to expedite response to 
the immense needs for assistance. The fast-track system for the conflict-affected 
areas in Mindanao was approved by the president of JICA on December 28, 2006, 
and two development study projects have been covered by the system. 
Japan’s Tripartite Cooperation Mechanism
The aforementioned functions of the Task Force, IMT, and J-BIRD indicate that 
there were close interrelated linkages among the three modes of assistance, as 
shown in Figure 1. JICA took part in all of the three modes of assistance and 
played a significant role in establishing a tripartite cooperation mechanism by 
generating synergy among the three functions: peacemaking, peacekeeping, and 
peacebuilding. First, the IMT and J-BIRD focused on providing a peace dividend, 
with the socio-economic development needs assessment provided by the Japanese 
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IMT member to be realized by J-BIRD. 
Second, the IMT and Task Force strengthened local and central connections 
in terms of exchanging information as well as by connecting concerned actors 
between Mindanao and Manila. The Task Force and ICG complemented each 
other in the sense that through the ICG the consolidated internal views among 
the Japanese stakeholders in the Task Force could be conveyed to the official 
peace talks, and at the same time the progress of the peace talks could also be 
shared with the Task Force. While the Japanese expert on the IMT provided the 
Task Force with information on local security and other relevant issues, the Task 
Force disseminated messages and information concerning the peace process to 
the local communities through the IMT. In Cotabato, for example, a Japanese 
IMT member frequently contacted MILF peace panel members and local NGOs 
to maintain good working relationships with the local actors. 
Third, there was good synergy between J-BIRD and the Task Force. With 
first-hand information on the peace process from the Japanese Embassy, JICA’s 
development assistance could be implemented in tandem with the progress of the 
peace process. The alignment of JICA’s development assistance with the progress 
of the peace process became much smoother after the Japanese Embassy, as a 
member of the ICG, commenced its function as an official observer. Thus, the 
aforementioned close relations among the IMT, J-BIRD, and Task Force strongly 
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Figure 1. Japan’s Tripartite Cooperation Mechanism for Mindanao
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peace process.
JICA and Track One-and-a-Half Mediation
Development assistance in the unstable security situation under the cease-fire 
agreement gave JICA an opportunity to find an alternative way of contributing 
to the peace process between the Philippine government and the MILF. When 
the peace process reached a stalemate, JICA, in collaboration with Malaysian 
partners, tried Track One-and-a-Half mediation in order to revive the peace 
process and assist the Track One negotiations. 
Security conditions served as a barometer for the progress of the peace talks. 
When the peace negotiations went well, security issues did not hinder the work 
of development assistance. However, whenever the peace negotiations reached 
a stalemate and a tense mood prevailed, a number of armed clashes would take 
place. In such an insecure situation, development assistance could not continue 
and aid workers had to evacuate to safer places (JICA 2011, 10-11). If the security 
situation deteriorated and kept the peace process at a standstill for a considerable 
time, the threat would emerge that aid programs could be terminated. 
For example, after facing insecure conditions with skirmishes in 2007-2009, 
JICA found it difficult to carry out its assistance in Mindanao. Although the 
Task Force monitored the peace process and the Japanese Embassy took relevant 
political actions, these responses were on ad-hoc bases and not part of a coherent 
government policy. In such a circumstance there emerged views within JICA that 
the agency needed to change its mind-set in order to provide assistance under the 
cease-fire agreement. JICA would somehow need to be involved in peacemaking 
to some extent in order to break the deadlock in the peace process itself. 
As Wennmann (2011, 62) notes, this echoes a newly emerging perspective 
that development assistance on its own is insufficient as an incentive for 
belligerents to suspend hostilities, but it can be an important part of peacemaking 
if it is placed within a broader political or military context. Wennmann (89-
90) points out that, in recent years, there has been an ever-growing recognition 
among development actors that development assistance is not just an economic 
but also a political process that involves state-building, governance reform, and 
dispute settlement. In the case of JICA, it gradually began to look at its assistance 
from such a different perspective and moved forward in playing a more active role 
in the peace process in Mindanao. Co-organizing a series of the Consolidation 
for Peace (COP) seminars with the Unit of Research and Education for Peace, 
Universiti Sains Malaysia in Penang, was its response to this challenge. 
Aside from involvement in the Malaysia-led IMT, the COP seminars, in 
partnership with the university, have been Japan’s most visible collaboration with 
Malaysia (MOFA 2007). To date, Consolidation for Peace Seminars have been 
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organized five times as listed below. COP1, COP2, and COP4 were organized for 
three different conflict areas, namely Mindanao, Aceh, and Southern Thailand, 
while COP3 and COP5 were designed exclusively for Mindanao. 
• COP1: January 23-26, 2006 for Mindanao, Aceh, and Southern Thailand
• COP2: September 2-6, 2007 for Mindanao, Aceh, and Southern Thailand
• COP3: January 12-16, 2009 exclusively for Mindanao
• COP4: February 21-25, 2011 for Mindanao, Aceh, and Southern Thailand 
• COP5: January 16-20, 2012 exclusively for Mindanao
The character of the COP seminars gradually shifted from that of fora for mutual 
learning to Track One-and-a-Half mediations. COP1 offered a mutual learning 
opportunity for participants from Mindanao with those from Aceh and Southern 
Thailand. The Mindanawans showed their special interest in the peace process 
of Aceh, which had been advanced through the Helsinki Peace Accord. COP1 
also had a major impact on Japan’s commitment to Mindanao. The action agenda 
adopted at the end of the seminar included two recommendations to Japan: (1) 
that the Government of Japan join the IMT as civilian monitors in the area of 
socio-economic development assessment and monitoring, and (2) that JICA 
engage the BDA as its partner (Askandar and Abubakar 2008, 6). COP1 was the 
very first opportunity for JICA to contact the actors in the peace process. The 
representative of the JICA Philippine Office, who attended the seminar, took 
immediate action by flying to Cotabato to discuss possible collaboration with the 
BDA. The discussion eventually created a capacity-building training course for 
the BDA within six months. 
COP2 and COP4 were also attended by representatives from the three 
conflict areas. During COP2 and also COP4, the Mindanao and Aceh groups 
were able to share and benefit from each other’s experiences since there were 
similar dynamics in the two peace processes (Askandar and Abubakar 2008, 
8-11). Of particular importance was the fact that both Mohagher Iqbal (chair of 
the MILF Peace Panel) and Malik Mahmud (former Prime Minister of Aceh Free 
Movement) participated in COP4, enabling the two leaders to engage in informal 
discussions on outstanding issues related to the two peace processes. 
COP1, COP2, and COP4 were uniquely effective in providing opportunities 
for engaging in consultations and finding new perspectives and strategies for the 
different peace processes, and they were certainly appreciated by the participants. 
However, the impacts created by COP3 and COP5 on the Mindanao peace 
process were greater in the sense that both seminars were organized to address 
immense needs with the right people and the right agenda. COP3, focused 
exclusively on Mindanao, was held in January 2009 in Penang five months 
after the suspension of signing the MOA-AD. When the Supreme Court of the 
Philippines stamped the MOA-AD as unconstitutional in October 2008, the peace 
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process was on the verge of being abolished. All dialogues had been suspended, 
even informal ones between the antagonists. By the time COP3 was proposed a 
stark mood of pessimism permeated the civil society actors in Mindanao. 
COP3 came at a perfect time when these participants and peace actors 
sought a platform to meet and discuss the stalemate in the Mindanao peace 
process. No official Track One negotiators attended COP3 as it was held under the 
worst circumstances for the peace process. In this sense COP3 took Track Two 
and Track Three approaches and its main objective became addressing how the 
civil society groups in Mindanao could contribute to putting the peace process 
back on track. As its outcome, the group recommended three interconnected 
processes: resumption of the formal peace talks, consultations at the community 
level, and sharing of information and advocacy between conflict parties and 
across stakeholders (Askandar and Abubakar 2009). 
It was again good timing when COP5 was organized in Penang in January 
2012. It came just one month after the joint statement by the Philippine 
government and the MILF agreeing to continue their discussions on the 
substantive points for purposes of crafting a framework agreement. COP5 was 
marked by its forward-looking agenda on the peace process and by participation 
by the full range of stakeholders. The range and effectiveness of participation 
by Track One players was greatly expanded. In addition to the Secretary 
of the Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process and both the 
Philippine government and MILF Peace Panels, other participants included 
government officials, such as the Secretary of the Department of Interior and 
Local Government, lawmakers, governors, senators, and congressmen. Other 
stakeholders in the peace process, including the IMT and ICG, were also invited 
alongside the ARMM officials and some members of the MNLF, who would be 
involved in designing the blueprint for a future Bangsamoro entity. 
The seminar dealt with specific issues in the peace process, such as forms 
of governance and political systems, constitutional reform, power sharing, 
wealth sharing, and post-conflict development. These issues were presented and 
discussed both in plenary and group working sessions. Although COP5 did 
not aim at producing concrete answers to the outstanding issues in the peace 
process, sharing opinions and concerns among the participants from all the levels 
(including the Track One actors) nevertheless served to revitalize the process. 
One of the significant effects from COP5 could be seen in the inclusion of the 
governors of the ARMM in the succeeding Track One peace talks.
Judging from the nature of the seminars and the levels of the participants, it 
is fair to say that COP 5 could be regarded as Track One-and-a-Half mediation in 
the current Mindanao peace process. In accordance with Wennmann, mediation 
is defined as a strategy of conflict management with the aim of shifting the 
interaction between parties from being authoritarian or adversarial to integrative 
and problem-solving, which can be located between arbitration and conciliation 
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(Wennmann 2011, 6). Moreover, Track One-and-a-Half mediation has been 
defined as an unusually direct way for unofficial actors to contribute to official 
peacemaking (Nan 2005, 161). 
Track One-and-a-Half mediation brings the strength of Track One 
mediation—the direct engagement of senior official representatives of the conflict 
parties—together with the power of Track Two mediation, informal off-the-
record workshops on conflict resolution. Track One-and-a-Half mediation can 
foster a core group with official negotiation skills who can develop personal 
understandings of and relationships with each other, and also share substantive 
insights into the conflict issues that divide them (Nan 2005, 161). It should be 
highlighted that the very strong human network and conceptualization capacity 
of the Universiti Sains Malaysia were the critical engines that created the COP 
seminars as Track One-and-a-Half mediations. JICA was a beneficiary of the 
COP seminars as well as a facilitator, in the sense that JICA gained knowledge 
of the peace process, expanded its human network in Mindanao, and gathered 
feedback for J-BIRD. 
The impact of the COP seminars on JICA’s continuing peacebuilding efforts 
can be illustrated in three different dimensions. First, JICA’s new role in the 
Mindanao peace process has been articulated and recognized by stakeholders, 
including the Japanese embassy in the Philippines. The embassy has been 
supportive of JICA’s involvement in the COP seminars because the embassy, as a 
member of the ICG, is unable to organize such seminars at the Track One-and-a-
Half level. Whatever the embassy does in relation to the peace process is regarded 
as Track One activity, which may cause friction with the Malaysian government 
as an official facilitator of the peace process. It can be said that the stakeholders’ 
expectations and image regarding JICA has shifted from that of a development 
agency merely providing economic assistance to a more reliable partner in 
encouraging local efforts in peacebuilding. 
Second, the COP seminars have been a means for JICA to connect the 
bottom-up approach of its development assistance with the top-down approach 
of the peace talks in collaboration with its Malaysian partners. As discussed 
earlier, JICA entered Mindanao under the cease-fire agreement with the aim of 
promoting the peace process through its development assistance. It has been, 
however, difficult to influence the Track One actors with a bottom-up approach 
without a common platform between them. JICA, in alignment with the activities 
of the Malaysian partners, subsequently discovered the importance of involving 
Track Two actors, including senators, congressmen, and governors, who had not 
been included in the ongoing peace process. JICA has learned that it could, in 
fact, be a good connector between the actors involved in the top-down approach 
and those working in the bottom-up approach, as John Paul Lederach articulated 
in a model that he termed Actors and Approaches to Peacebuilding (Lederach 
1997, 39). In this sense, it can be said that cooperation with the Malaysian 
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Figure 2. Concept of COP Seminars
Figure 3. COP Seminar and Japan’s Tripartite Cooperation Mechanism for Mindanao
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(development experts)
J-BIRD Task Force 
ICG
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with the state 
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partners enabled JICA to reach out to the middle-range actors, who play the role 
of connector between the top-down and bottom-up approaches, as shown in 
Figure 2.
Third, the COP seminars have also had a positive impact on the framework 
of the aforementioned tripartite cooperation mechanism of Japan in Mindanao. 
The COP seminars have provided J-BIRD, the development component of the 
IMT, and the Task Force with feedback from the local seminar participants. In 
this way Japan’s involvement in Mindanao with the three different mechanisms 
was reviewed and strengthened. Since each COP seminar included development 
assistance as an agenda item, JICA, alongside Japanese members of the IMT, 
could exchange ideas and concerns on J-BIRD with the participants and obtain 
valuable feedback from them. JICA then applied the feedback in its work on the 
ground. Discussions in the COP seminars were also reported to the Task Force.6 It 
can be said that the COP seminars have been an important feedback mechanism 
for Japan’s assistance to Mindanao and have further strengthened Japan’s tripartite 
cooperation mechanism as shown in Figure 3.
Conclusion 
Japan’s commitment to Mindanao has been carried out through a unique 
tripartite cooperation mechanism. This mechanism has enhanced the 
effectiveness of Japan’s assistance to Mindanao by enabling Japan’s participation 
in peacemaking with the Task Force/ICG, peacekeeping with the IMT, and also 
peacebuilding through J-BIRD. JICA has been involved in all three modes of 
assistance, thus enabling JICA to manage development assistance in balance with 
the peace process. In other words, it can be said that peacebuilding can be carried 
out more effectively and confidently with the synergetic effect of peacekeeping 
and peacemaking efforts. Moreover, assistance under the volatile cease-fire 
agreement has given JICA another dimension to its mission. When the peace 
process reached a stalemate, it was deemed necessary, as discussed earlier, to 
connect JICA’s assistance on the ground with the bottom-up approach and the 
political peace process with the top-down approach by mobilizing the middle-
range actors as connectors. This measure was indispensable for reactivating the 
peace process at all levels. In this way the bottom-up approach was secured and 
even empowered. The partnership with Malaysia enabled JICA to reach out to 
the middle-range actors. The COP seminars, at the same time, have played a 
role as the feedback mechanism for Japan’s tripartite cooperation mechanism 
to strengthen the confidence and trust between Japan and local stakeholders in 
the peace process at all levels. The case of Mindanao echoes the observation that 
there is a growing recognition in the development community of the potential 
role of mediation outside its traditional role in conflict resolution (Wennmann 
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2011, 94).
Additionally, some lessons have been learned from JICA’s experience 
in Mindanao in terms of peacebuilding assistance with the perspective of 
peacemaking. First, a development agency is not completely free from the 
political implications of a peace process, especially if development assistance 
is commenced before a peace accord is concluded. A development agency 
accumulates local knowledge and develops trust with local people and 
communities during its assistance on the ground, which can be of use in 
peacemaking. Aside from Track Two and Track Three mediations, even Track 
One-and-a-Half mediation can be carried out if certain conditions are met. 
Second, and more importantly, close collaboration between peacebuilding and 
peacemaking should be emphasized. While peacebuilding is mentioned in Japan’s 
ODA Charter of 2003 as a priority area, there is no set governmental policy on 
peacemaking. As Japan’s tripartite cooperation mechanism as well as the COP 
seminars imply, Japan’s peacebuilding assistance could be carried out more 
effectively in tandem with the government’s peacemaking efforts if the Japanese 
government pays more attention to peacemaking in a systemic way. 
The effectiveness of Japan’s peacebuilding assistance in southern Thailand 
and Myanmar will soon be tested. Drawing a lesson from the Mindanao case, 
Japan’s participation in peacemaking efforts is the key to success of its future 
peacebuilding efforts. In this sense, closer collaboration between Japan’s foreign 
ministry and JICA will be indispensable.
Notes
1. On October 28, 2010, the Philippine Information Agency released an online report: 
“DFA Shifts to ISO initials ‘ph’ and ‘phl’.” The initials “GRP” will no longer be used. The 
report of ABS-CBN news read: “DFA junks ‘RP,’ adopts ‘PH’ or ‘PHL’.” On November 16, 
2010, the Philippine Consulate in New York released to the press, “Philippines ADOPTS 
ISO 3166-1, from RP to PH.” See, Mindanews. http://www.mindanews.com/mindaviews/
comment/2011/01/22/”grp”-to”gph”-why/ (accessed September 26, 2012). This article 
therefore uses the “GRP” up to the Arroyo administration in 2010, while the “GPH” is used 
to address the current Aquino administration onwards.
2. Under the 1976 Tripoli Agreement the Philippine Government and the MNLF 
reached a compromise agreement to establish an Autonomous Region in the Moro Land. 
According to the agreement, thirteen provinces out of 25 claimed by the MNLF were to be 
included in the formation of the Autonomous Government.
3. The Joint Statement of July 29, 2009 was signed by Ambassador Rafael E. Seguis, GRP 
Panel Chairman, and also by Mohagher Iqbal, MILF Panel Chairman, in the presence of 
Dato Othman Bin Abdul Razak as Third Party Facilitator.
4. The author’s meeting with Brig. General Edgardo M. Gurrea on September 13, 2006 at 
the office of the GRP Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities in Cotabato.
5. The author interviewed Naoyuki Ochiai, an IMT member, on July 14, 2011 in 
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Cotabato.
6. The 52nd Task Force meeting on January 27, 2012.
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